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1961 SEP 26 PM 8

13887

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS TOPOL 434

RPT INFO: USLO SACLANT NOFORN FOR COLLINS ~~DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR~~
North Atlantic Treaty Organ.
USRO PASS STOESEL

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TOPOL 410 - RPTD SACLANT 26

TS authority to:
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() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

Understand from Finletter-Pessenden telecon that new proposal for proceeding with NATO long-range planning has been worked out with Stikker and that further instructions not needed for September 26 meeting. However, for your background, ~~following are segments which had been prepared for your use as indicated in TOPOL 410.~~

EXCERPT

~~NOTE~~ It is ~~the~~ considered opinion of ~~the~~ U.S. that, in identifying Soviet and Satellite non-nuclear aggression below ~~the~~ level of unmistakable general attack, NATO should have ~~the~~ capability of meeting such aggression with ~~the~~ non-nuclear force necessary to force ~~the~~ aggressor to withdraw to or ~~to~~ force him to realize that he must intensify his effort in ~~the~~ knowledge that ~~the~~ full military weight of ~~the~~ Alliance, including external forces, will meet him. This extension of NATO's non-nuclear capability is required to complement ~~the~~ nuclear deterrent by offering

a clear

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Clearence:

DOB - Mr. Nitso

EUR/RA - Mr. Pessenden

S/S-CR

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deterrent to sizeable non-nuclear aggression, below ~~the~~ level of unmistakable a clear and unmistakable/general attack, which is intended to present NATO with a fait accompli. ~~XXXXXXXX~~

~~XXXXXX~~ In extension of this thought, ~~the~~ U.S. considers that:

a. In the event of nuclear attack, or of a non-nuclear attack with which NATO non-nuclear forces clearly could not cope, there must be no hesitation in applying ~~the~~ full force at NATO's disposal, including external strategic forces if they should be required.

b. For ~~the~~ intermediate case, NATO must be capable of responding with force which is suitable and adequate. Against non-nuclear aggression of limited or indeterminate size, NATO's initial response should be non-nuclear. Such response, if backed up by adequate nuclear and non-nuclear strength, should permit adequate time for a Soviet political decision to terminate hostilities or for a NATO political decision concerning use of nuclear weapons. ~~XXXXXXXX~~

~~XXXXXX~~ Again ~~the~~ U.S. reaffirms its intention to maintain strategic forces capable of defeating Soviet forces, and, if necessary, of devastating ~~the~~ Soviet Union; it is determined to use these forces in ~~the~~ common defense of its NATO Allies if that should prove necessary. ~~XXXXXXXX~~

~~XXXXXX~~ Particularly in light of ~~the~~ Berlin situation, but for ~~the~~ long term as well, ~~the~~ U.S. considers that ~~the~~ most urgent task facing ~~the~~ Alliance is that of increasing now ~~the~~ non-nuclear strength of our forces in Central Europe; a task in which we are engaged. It is ~~the~~ opinion of ~~the~~ U.S. that these forces should possess ~~the~~ capability to meet non-nuclear aggression above ~~the~~ level contemplated

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by a literal, narrow, interpretation of ~~the~~ Political Directive (C-M(56)138(Final) and ~~the~~ Strategic Concept (MC 14/2 Revised). As indicated by their comments expressed in ~~the~~ Council meeting on 18 September, it appears that this view is generally shared by ~~the~~ members of ~~the~~ Council. ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ U.S. Continues to recognize ~~the~~ necessity to use nuclear weapons including ~~the~~ external strategic forces, in general war, and has never advocated any change in, or reinterpretation of, this aspect of these directives. However, ~~the~~ U.S. does not agree that NATO should permit, or in fact encourage, general war to occur through its failure to provide ~~the~~ forces needed to deal with, where appropriate, a lesser alternative. ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~ In order to carry through these thoughts, ~~the~~ U.S. approves ~~the~~ SYG paper (FO/61/714) subject to ~~the~~ following changes:

Para 1. Omit ~~the~~ bracketed portion recommended by ~~the~~ Military Authorities from this paragraph and include this same thought in paragraph 7 as discussed below.

Para 5. In ~~the~~ fourth sentence, after ~~the~~ words 'remain valid' insert 'broadly interpreted.'

Reason: as indicated in ~~the~~ U.S. presentation of 26 April 1961, we do not recommend any change in ~~the~~ wording of ~~the~~ Political Directive or of ~~the~~ Strategic Concept, but we do believe that we should recognize that a broader, more constructive, interpretation is required. Accordingly, we do not wish to reaffirm a literal, narrow interpretation which we do not consider to be in ~~the~~ best interest of ~~the~~ Alliance.

Para 7

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Para. 7. Delete ~~the~~ last three sentences and substitute following: QUOTE
It is necessary to give NATO a wider choice of effective response to aggression
than either unnecessarily going to general war or leaving ~~the~~ enemy to determine
~~the~~ intensity of action at each stage ~~UNQUOTE~~.

Reason: Here again, we do not wish to reaffirm a literal, narrow interpretation
of our basic directives; an interpretation that would serve to limit even ~~the~~
flexibility which has been developed by interpretation during ~~the~~ past several
years. In ~~the~~ past, SACEUR has spoken of QUOTE Raising ~~the~~ Threshold ~~UNQUOTE~~
~~UNQUOTE~~ and of QUOTE ~~the~~ pause UNQUOTE, both of which serve to give a broader
interpretation to these directives. Our change is intended to recognize ~~the~~
necessity for, and ~~the~~ advantages of, having a wider range of alternatives than
an all or nothing response. ~~UNQUOTE~~

~~UNQUOTE~~. Para 8. Delete ~~the~~ first sentence.

Reason: This sentence is not necessary, and its inclusion is awkward when ~~the~~
last three sentences of para 7 are deleted.

Para 9. Delete ~~the~~ clause in ~~the~~ first sentence which reads: QUOTE which
in fact reaffirm ~~the~~ validity of ~~the~~ Political Directive (C-M(56)138(Final) and
of ~~the~~ Strategic Concept (MC 14/2 Revised) in ~~the~~ light of present circumstances.
~~UNQUOTE~~.

Reason: This clause is not necessary to ~~the~~ purpose of ~~the~~ sentence, which is to
cause ~~the~~ Military authorities to take action on ~~the~~ 1966 force requirements. Its
inclusion would negate ~~the~~ attempt to provide ~~the~~ broader interpretation which we
consider necessary. ~~UNQUOTE~~

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